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Abstract 
Despite significant donor funding, government accounting reforms seeking transparent and 
effective management of public resources often fail or have limited success, especially in 
Africa, prompting questions about donors’ implementation approach and calls for studies of 
successful reforms. This paper investigates a local government accounting reform in Benin 
supported by a German development agency – perceived as successful due to the participatory, 
pragmatic and incremental approach reinforced by conditionalities in the face of neo-
patrimonial leadership. 
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1. Introduction 
Government accounting reforms in Africa to fight corruption and mismanagement, and 
improve transparency and accountability have disappointed (Andrews, 2012, 2013; Harrison, 
2004; Hopper et al., 2012, 2016). They generally emanate from the World Bank (WB), the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), and bilateral development arrangements agencies from 
developed countries, who often contract out the design and implementation to consultants from 
‘Northern’, often ‘Big 4’, accounting firms (Graham and Annisette, 2012). Research (Iyoha 
and Oyerinde, 2010; Goddard et al., 2015; Lassou and Hopper, 2016) and donor reports (Hove 
and Wynne, 2010; Lienert and Sarraf, 2001) suggest indigenous civil servants are often 
marginalised (Schiavo-Campo, 2009), perceived negatively and as ‘passive recipients’ of 
Northern technologies (Neu et al., 2006) likely to resist due to self-interest (Bierschenk et al., 
2003). In parallel, foreign consultants neglect gradual, incremental change, and import overly 
complex systems unsuited to local circumstances (Andrews, 2013; Hove and Wynne, 2010; 
McLeod and Harun, 2014). Hence calls for studies of successful accounting reforms, especially 
decentralised donor-led developments within communities, villages and social groups, to 
determine what produces better outcomes (Rondinelli and Nellis, 1986). 
Research examining greater indigenous involvement is sparse, especially on local government 
where good governance initiatives foster decentralised, grassroots budget participation 
(Fontana and Grugel, 2016; WB, 1997, 2003). Hence, this paper analyses how civil servants in 
Benin, with support from GIZ1 (a German development agency), successfully designed and 
implemented a local government accounting reform (WMONEY) under difficult 
circumstances, especially neo-patrimonial governance. It contributes to research on 
participatory development of government accounting in developing countries (Lassou and 
Hopper, 2016). Section 2 presents the research arguments and analytical framework; Section 3 
the research methods; Section 4 the reform’s context; Section 5 the findings; and Section 6 the 
conclusions. 
2. Accounting reform in Africa: reconciling participatory development with neo-
patrimonialism 
Development policies in Africa have veered from state socialism to neo-liberalism, and 
currently around good governance (Hopper et al. 2017). A recurring finding is that (regardless 
of approach), when sound accounting and accountability systems are adopted, they often play a 
ceremonial role to gain legitimacy from citizens and external funders rather than aiding ministerial 
and parliamentary scrutiny, operational decision-making and accountability (Hopper et al., 2009). 
Political not legal-rational or economic criteria dominate when politicians exercise patronage to 
bolster political support or for personal gain. The result is often fiscal crises and requests for 
																																								 																				
1  Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), established by the German Federal Ministry for 
Economic Cooperation and Development, is one of two German development agencies. It seeks international 
cooperation for sustainable development in over 130 countries (including 39 African countries). In Benin, GIZ is 
involved in proverty reduction and capacity buiding at central and local government levels. It focuses on: 
decentralisation and municipal development (good governance); agriculture and adaptation to climate change; and 
rural/urban water supply and sanitation and its management..In 2015, GIZ’s activities worldwide was estimated 
at over 2.1 billion euros (see. https://www.giz.de/en/html/index.html [Accessed: 27/03/2017] 
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assistance from international financial institutions, especially the IMF and the WB, who in the 
1980s and 1990s, regarded many governments as too big, unwieldy, corrupt, and a hindrance to 
development. Conditions for assistance, often in structural adjustment programmes, reflected a 
neo-liberal, market-based agenda. New Public Management, incorporating private sector-based 
accounting and, from the late 1990s, integrated financial management information systems and 
medium-term expenditure frameworks were frequently prescribed. Aware that fiscal crises 
precipitate political crises, African governments knew they must (or appear to) comply. IMF 
and WB officers, until recently predominately macroeconomists, saw accounting as a technical 
matter and usually followed advice from Northern accounting professional bodies, transnational 
accounting bodies (e.g. International Federation of Accountants), and ‘Big 4’ accounting firms 
(Hopper et al., 2009; 2012). They tended to recommend ‘one-size fits all’ packages (Hedger 
and de Renzio, 2010) incorporating ‘best practices’ from developed countries, albeit with 
terminological changes to insinuate local adaptation (Awio et al., 2007; Hove and Wynne, 2010; 
Schiavo-Campo, 2009). The results often disappointed (Andrews, 2012). Many reforms lacked 
contextual fit, outstripped local capacity, demoralised civil servants, lacked political support and 
were overly complex and ‘ill-conceived’ (Bakre, 2008; Andrews, 2013); leading to allegations 
that the WB is obsessed with large development programmes and evaluating a country’s 
accounting progress by its adoption of international standards and systems (Harrison, 2004).  
Recently, emphasis has switched to the ‘Capable State’ and ‘Good Governance’ (WB, 1992, 
1997). Market-based reforms remain but alongside building capacity in state institutions, 
increasing business and civil society involvement, and transparent information. Many countries 
undertook such reforms voluntarily although they were often conditions for financial assistance 
(Chang, 2006). More donor funding now enters government coffers directly rather than to specific 
projects and delivery agencies. This requires better accounting controls; better motivated, trained 
and remunerated civil servants; and greater delegation of powers and resources to local 
governments and communities, e.g. through village development committees, commune 
accountability boards, and citizen complaint procedures. 
‘Participatory development’, whilst not novel (Cleaver, 1999; Morris, 2003), has moved up the 
discursive agenda of international development institutions (Ackerman, 2004; WB, 1997, 
2003), which tallies with researchers’ calls for more indigenous involvement in government 
accounting reforms (Schiavo-Campo, 2009). This does not preclude learning from developed 
countries but uses local knowledge to incorporate citizen priorities into local decisions and to 
improve accountability (Bland, 2011). However, different ‘shades’ and models of participatory 
development exist. Who is ‘invited’, how they participate, and when ‘local’ participation arises, 
underpin the motives for, and outcomes of, participation. For instance, reasons may be 
efficiency, i.e., help developers achieve project outcomes within means, or empowerment, i.e. 
improve participants’ capacity to improve their lives and/or grant disadvantaged or 
marginalised social groups greater voice (Cleaver, 1999). An efficiency-led approach is 
instrumental. It grants local actors limited agency and expects them to operate apolitically 
(Cleaver, 1999) whereas in a participative approach people are seen “as agents rather than 
objects; capable of analyzing their own situations and designing their own solutions” 
(Cornwall and Jewkes, 1995: 1670). Participatory techniques often can legitimise projects 
rather than seek real change (Ackerman, 2004; Harrison, 2004; Speer, 2012; Irvin and 
Stansbury, 2004) yet they have had successes in accounting, e.g., decentralised budgeting, and 
community-based accountability combined with some new public management-style reporting 
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in Uganda (Awio and Northcott, 2001; Awio et al., 2007); and Ghanaian state agencies’ 
involvement in designing performance contracts (Dodoo, 1997). Accounting reforms can 
progress, especially if initially small-scale and they expand carefully and incrementally, 
recognising the process’s long-term nature (Rondinelli and Nellis, 1986; Romijn and Caniels, 
2011).  
Weak governance, especially neo-patrimonialism 2 , frustrate many African initiatives 
(Cammack, 2007; Médard, 1983). Neo-patrimonialism exists when political control rests on 
personal and/or charismatic power. A Weberian rational-legal bureaucracy and a formal façade 
of rules may exist but political leaders override or ignore them and raid public resources for 
private use, political gain or to maintain patronage, clientelism, corruption, nepotism, or 
ethnic/religious primacy (Hopper, 2017). Opaque management (or mismanagement) of state 
resources and weak accounting often go hand-in-hand with this, leading to misappropriations 
of state funds and jobs, and non-payment of taxes (Akakpo, 2009). Tacit acceptance fosters 
civil service incompetence and mediocracy, and hinders capacity building (Sandbrook and 
Oelbaum, 1997). Neo-patrimonial leaders may not welcome transparent accounting that 
improves accountability but may adopt it for legitimacy and external funding purposes and then 
ignore or circumvent it or even use it to persecute political opponents (Harrison, 2004).  
Whilst the neopatrimonialism concept has been criticised (especially by development economists 
e.g. Moreno, 2003; Mkandawire, 2015), it permeates many African government accounting 
reforms (Hopper et al., 2009; Hopper, 2017). Neopatrimonialism may not be invariably 
problematic from an economic perspective – centralised pro-development neo-patrimonial 
leadership can provide essential vertical authority, coordination and support for development 
projects combined with local problem solving attuned to local cultures (Crook and Booth, 
2011; Hopper, 2017); and they can make effective bureaucratic reforms (von Soest, 2006). 
Moreover, depicting all relations as privatized or informal does not reflect African realities – 
one must distinguish between rulers and officials. For example, following donor advice and 
despite a neo-patrimonial regime, Zambia’s Revenue Authority was established resulting in less 
corruption, an effective tax collection bureaucracy, and increased tax revenues (von Soest, 2006); 
and civil servants granted substantial autonomy and clear lines of responsibility in Ghana and 
Tanzania reformed corrupt and inefficient departments (Fjeldstad, 2003; Olowu, 1999).  
This research explores these issues by investigating whether a decentralised local government 
accounting reform in Benin by indigenous officials was more effective than all-encompassing 
systems designed and implemented by foreign experts at the national level at a foreign 
government’s behest. It reveals how central government officials and GIZ helped enact 
politically feasible reforms in the face of neo-patrimonial leadership. 
3. Research methods 
During a project examining government accounting in Francophone Africa, Treasury and 
Accounting Department (TAD) officials in Benin mentioned a computerised accounting 
system, WMONEY, designed locally to produce local government accounts. It was decided to 
investigate this as research on local government accounting reforms in Africa is sparse, 
especially successful ones that produce financial accounts and information for decision-making, 
																																								 																				
2 For detailed theoretical development, see Lassou and Hopper (2016) 
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make resources transferred to municipalities and their expenditure more transparent; and 
increase citizen and local community involvement in budgeting and accountability.  
A letter and interview guide was submitted to the TAD but data collection was delayed. Public 
administration in Francophone Africa is characterised by secrecy, and access to information is 
difficult and challenging (Verschave and Bakaria, 2001; Lassou and Hopper, 2016). This 
persisted throughout field visits in August and November 2014, and December 2015. Despite 
formal authorisation, it proved impossible to interview several officials. Typically, some would 
accept invitations but repeatedly find excuses to postpone interviews or vacated their office at 
the scheduled time, which enabled them to decline without appearing to say so. 
Eventually ten participants 3  participated: four TAD officials who developed and used 
WMONEY; three public accountants in three local governments who used WMONEY; a local 
government budgetary accountant; and two GIZ officials who helped coordinate and advise on 
the project. Semi-structured interviews with open-ended questions were conducted. Responses 
were corroborated to increase the validity and reliability of findings. Four interviews were face-
to-face, four by telephone and two by Skype. Three interviewees were re-interviewed to 
confirm responses and get additional data. Interviews lasted between thirty minutes and one 
hour forty minutes. Notes were taken and interviews recorded electronically, where feasible or 
permitted. 
Some attempts to access relevant documents were successful – others were not. For example, 
the State Chief Accountant – the Receveur Général des Finances – recommended getting these 
from the Division responsible for documentation but when approached, they denied access 
without his authorisation. From then further contact was impossible. Nonetheless, documents 
on the accounting reforms’ results and WMONEY’s functionalities, a user manual, and an 
assessment report, from other sources and GIZ were helpful. Further corroborating evidence 
came from workplace observations. The data was coded manually regarding participatory and 
incremental development, neo-patrimonialism, actors involved, incentives provided, roles 
played, activities performed, and outcomes achieved. 
4. Benin and the context of accounting reforms  
Benin is a low-income economy; its population of 10.9 million in 2015 has a gross national 
income per capita of US$7624. Life expectancy is 54 and 58 for males and females respectively; 
adult literacy is 42% (WB, 2013); and it ranks 165th of 187 countries on the 2014 human 
development index. Formerly a French colony from 1902-1960, it gained independence in 1960 
and was politically stable until 1963. Various coups d’état occurred until 1972 when an 
authoritarian Marxist-Leninist military regime assumed power. It collapsed in 1989 amidst 
widespread financial and macroeconomic mismanagement and endemic corruption (Akapko, 
2009; Gisselquist, 2008). Benin virtually had no accounting institutions at independence. The 
TAD and Chambre des Comptes – the supreme audit institution – were created but their 
functionality was limited. Following a transition period (1989-1991), under international 
pressure, Benin adopted a new Constitution incorporating a democratic multi-party political 
system. Presidential and parliamentary elections have occurred every five years and four years 
respectively, with some media and civil society scrutiny. However, no government accounts 
materialised until 1998. Accounting was manual, dominated by budgetary allocations and cash 
disbursements, and weak recording and controls, mostly at TAD headquarters, facilitated errors, 
collusion and fraud. 
																																								 																				
3 Respondents’ exact profile is not disclosed to retain confidentiality. 
4	http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/benin	[Accessed:	27/03/2017]	
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Despite its pluralist democracy and the rule of law remaining incomplete, Benin is cited as a 
‘model’ of democracy, given the region’s weak democratic credentials (Bierschenk and de 
Sardan, 2003). Benin has implemented several poverty reduction strategy policies within 
structural adjustment programmes requiring improvements in its macroeconomic environment, 
health and education, public financial management, and good governance (IMF, 2003). 
Implementation relies on foreign expertise and finance, and donor pressure (Bierschenk et al., 
2003; African Development Bank, 2012; WB, 2011). The political system favours the 
executive, particularly the President, who can bypass the Assemblée Nationale (Parliament) 
and the budgetary process (African Development Bank, 2005). Benin’s governance remains 
neo-patrimonial: characterised by clientelism, politicised administration, corruption, and weak 
state regulatory and implementation capacities. This frustrates accounting reforms within 
poverty reduction initiatives (Bierschenk et al., 2003), and circumvents internal controls 
introduced to reduce embezzlement (Blundo et al., 2006).  
In 1998-1999, a central government accounting system (WMONEY), designed by indigenous 
IT civil servants, was implemented but was replaced by a French system (ASTER) around 
2002-2004. Both systems are computerised accounting programmes that record government 
transactions and produce financial reports. Germany, a major donor, supported the first local 
elections in 2002, which brought about seventy-seven municipalities. They wanted to: increase 
grassroots participation in identifying development needs and allocating municipal resources; 
and improve accountability and delivery of services (Bierschenk and de Sardan, 2003). GIZ 
has operated in Benin for thirty-five years supporting sustainable development and poverty 
reduction initiatives5. In 2012, it approached the TAD offering to improve local government 
accounting. It realised weak accounting and accountability, and limited transparency had 
stymied development programmes. After discussions with TAD officials and IT staff, they 
agreed to adapt WMONEY for this purpose. 
5. Participatory and Incremental Development 
5.1 Context of local government accounting reforms 
No legal local government framework existed until 1999 despite Articles 150-153 in the 
Constitution stipulating that elected local government members, led by an elected Mayor, have 
financial autonomy. After the 2002 elections, local governments’ financial management 
capacity was weak and under-resourced. It was impossible to get information on financial 
resources from donors and central government or how they were managed, which facilitated 
mismanagement and corruption. Donors had concentrated on central government accounting 
with scant attention to that of local governments. This changed in 2012 when twenty-five of 
the seventy-seven local governments received direct support from GIZ for accounting reforms. 
Receveurs-Percepteurs (public local government accountants) should send annual financial 
accounts (Compte de Gestion) for each local government to the Chamber of Accounts 
(Chambre des Comptes). However, TAD officials claimed the law did not prescribe how and 
in what form, so they were not produced. A GIZ official observed:  
The accounting function performed by the local public accountants before… WMONEY…was 
a major problem …they were not equipped …and others had little knowledge about what they 
were expected to do. 
Hence GIZ’s desire for reforms, as a GIZ official explained:  
																																								 																				
5 See: https://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/342.html [Accessed 8/12/2015] 
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To support not only the budget side but also …the spending side to ensure some 
transparency …and improve information flows on the use of local governments’ budget …[and] 
between local and central governments, and facilitate transparency of FADEC transfers 6. 
Initially, GIZ were unaware of WMONEY. A GIZ official explained: 
One option was to impose a financial system from elsewhere …but often these are not transferable 
and …there may be licence costs. … There may be locally available solutions …Since we are not 
IT or accounting experts, we … seek solutions that can work …in consultation with the partner 
country. … The other consideration is promotion of local expertise. 
Consistent with their participatory approach, GIZ discussed this with the TAD, who told them 
about WMONEY. A local development officer recalled: 
GIZ was looking for an accounting programme …they had problems with accountability and 
the production of the Compte de Gestion in local governments and needed a solution… We told 
them we don't need their financial resources to provide our Recettes-Perceptions7  with an 
accounting programme – we’ve got what they need [i.e., WMONEY]. They said OK, ‘you have 
six months to prove yourselves’. …Within six months we started producing results. 
The GIZ official confirmed this noting lessons from earlier budgeting reforms: 
Developers [private firms] had a monopoly position …[local] options could be less costly and 
the source codes would be under the control of the Ministry of Finance. So, for WMONEY we 
wanted the TAD to take control …they had already worked on it. 
Despite WMONEY’s abandonment for central government accounting, TAD’s IT staff had 
repeatedly requested permission to redesign it for local government accounting. This tallied 
with GIZ’s belief that local accounting solutions by local officials are more effective and 
cheaper than imported programmes implemented by foreign consultants.	
A TAD development team began redesigning WMONEY in 2012. Users, i.e. local government 
public accountants, provided accounting expertise and helped tailor WMONEY to their needs 
and working environment.  
We [IT staff] started working on the project …with those in charge of local government 
accounting (Service des Collectivités Locales) at the TAD. …We also had the Receveurs-
Percepteurs who provided information about the state of things and what they needed. That 
was the preparation phase. [Development team member]. 
The development team had experienced TAD IT staff – computer science graduates from the 
state’s school of management and economics (Institut National d’Economie). 8  They had 
undertaken training on government accounting by the regional oversight body –UEMOA9 – 
and donors, mostly the WB, IMF and the European Union (EU). They undertook regular 
personal development using the internet, IT resources, and manuals. Most senior public 
accountants graduated from the state’s school of public administration (Ecole Nationale 
d’Administration).10 Many had undertaken postgraduate studies in public administration at 
France’s Ecole Nationale du Trésor. However, local government accountants – the Receveurs-
Percepteurs – only graduated from the Ecole Nationale d’Administration; some lacked a 
																																								 																				
6 FADEC is the Municipal Development Support Fund (Fonds d’Appui au Développement Communal) whereby 
ministries and donors transfer resources to local governments. 
7 TAD decentralised offices responsible for local governments’ accounting. 	
8 Now: Ecole Nationale d’Economie Appliquée et de Management (ENEAM) 
9 Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine or ‘West African Economic and Monetary Union’ covering 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo. 
10 Now: Ecole Nationale d’Administration et de Magistrature. 
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degree after the Baccalaureate (i.e., A-Level equivalent). They needed several years of 
experience before being appointed but not invariably so.  
Initially TAD officials believed their staff responsible for local governments had sufficient 
expertise but development team members realised user involvement was crucial after meeting 
local government accountants: 
We worked with internal people but sometimes they did not have much on-site experience and 
didn't know much of the realities on the ground… [So] the information gathered at the TAD 
headquarters was not really adapted …we only learnt this during the first training to selected 
actual users [Receveurs-Percepteurs]. Fortunately, this allowed us to make necessary 
corrections. 
We realised there were many aspects we developed which were not relevant to their reality – 
because we did the design with people [at the headquarters] who were rather theoretical with 
limited practical considerations.  
So the development team involved users, with TAD personnel supplying leadership, 
coordination and IT expertise. The programme was implemented incrementally. A pilot was 
launched at one local government to assess its effectiveness and to limit failure costs should it 
fail. The results convinced doubters. A GIZ official recalled: 
The pilot phase focused on the redesign of WMONEY’s functionalities. Once this was 
completed …we used a local government – Ouidah – to test the programme. …A team entered 
all the accounting data covering the whole financial year into WMONEY and conducted the 
related accounting treatments. Following this, the year-end accounts were produced 
successfully. We presented these results to those who were reluctant to show them that with 
WMONEY they would do things more quickly, …and they would produce accounts …more 
reliable than when they had used Excel. 
GIZ organised training sessions and workshops for users and local government officials to 
build capacity ‘and to institutionalise WMONEY so people use it’ [GIZ official]. They covered 
technical aspects of WMONEY but also computer literacy because, ‘some Receveurs [had] 
never used a computer [senior TAD official]. Indeed, ‘some public officials holding accounting 
positions were not well qualified to use the tools they were provided with – not all could work 
with a computer’ [GIZ official].  
Sustaining accounting reforms is challenging in Africa. Many fail and disappear once donor 
support ends or locals lack the resources and capacity to sustain them (Andrews, 2013; Hopper 
et al., 2012). GIZ recognised this and ran training repeatedly, partly to address staff transfer 
problems. A GIZ official reflected: 
Unfortunately, staff transfers do not recognise the efforts made by donors and the TAD …We 
run training sessions for them and soon after they are moved …It is a major challenge… that’s 
why we run the training again and again for users …most who undertook the training in 2013 
are no longer in position.  
WMONEY was formally adopted and extended, with GIZ support, to twenty-four TAD 
decentralised offices dealing with local governments’ accounting. A development team 
member observed how: 
Upon this decision …we wanted the first results to show at the year-end. We were on-site in local 
governments and working hard to assist the accountants …to enter all transactions …from the start 
of the year – it wasn’t easy... We managed to do it for all 25 local governments.  
By 2013 WMONEY was effective. A GIZ 2014 presentation reported:  
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WMONEY is the accounting programme in local governments …used by local public 
accountants to produce the decadal, monthly and annual situational reports, and the financial 
accounts. 
With GIZ support, the State Chief Accountant (Receveur Général des Finances) issued a 
memorandum (2163/DGTCP/RGF/SCL/SP) in June 2013 stipulating that WMONEY was now 
the only recognised local government accounting system. A GIZ official noted:  
This meant that besides the 25 local governments that GIZ supports, the programme has been 
deployed in the remaining 52 local governments. 
A 2015 TAD report revealed ‘budget execution reports, procurement contract reports, surplus 
and deficit accounts, [and] a balance sheet’ had been added. Stakeholders reacted positively: 
WMONEY is a revolution. …In 2014, 76 local governments out of 77 produced their accounts – 
the only one which did not… had an administrative problem …In the past, only ten managed to 
produce accounts. …[All] struggled days and nights for three, four months. WMONEY came in and 
they now do it within a day! [Now] …they have more time to deal with other matters. Previously 
they complained about lack of personnel and other resources …The programme [satisfies] …a major 
requirement of donors who often complained they fund local governments but never got any 
accounts of how they spend the money [TAD official]. 
It was an event! The first time since decentralisation that almost all local governments produced the 
Compte de Gestion [Senior TAD official]. 
If the local government accountant keeps their accounting records up-to-date and regularly enters 
the transactions as they occur, they should be able to produce the financial accounts at the financial 
year-end …this is a major reform. …You should produce the financial accounts without the help of 
anyone. That’s an innovation! [User]. 
WMONEY is a positive experience. … People are proud of what they got… [WMONEY] facilitates 
the centralisation of data: instead of long data collection missions across local governments [TAD] 
now get this data easily …financial accounts are produced in all the local governments …They 
appreciated our approach. In terms of ownership …the experience is a success …compared with 
other experiences. [GIZ official]. 
A senior TAD official recalled how the development team now regularly visit users of 
WMONEY:  
A team composed of the IT people who designed and developed the programme, officials of 
local governments and from the TAD was set up to monitor all the local public 
accountants …So twice a year they visited every local government to monitor the use of the 
programme and deal with any issues or difficulties experienced… The IT people also helped 
correct any errors in the accounting treatment of transactions not initially foreseen. 
To limit human errors and improve the financial information’s reliability, an interface was 
initiated between WMONEY and the budget management programmes – GBCO and LGBC, 
also GIZ funded – at mayor’s offices. A senior TAD Official recounted how now: 
once a payment order is issued by the Mayor’s office it is transmitted electronically to 
WMONEY …there is no further manual entry regarding the order. The local government’s budget 
is also imported and integrated in WMONEY with eventual modification at the year-end: e.g. budget 
amendments.  
A development team member made similar observations: 
WMONEY and the budgetary programmes (GBCO and LGBC) exchange electronic data. We 
developed an interface to enable these exchanges. The Mayor’s office sends the data 
electronically …to WMONEY at the local public accountant’s office. WMONEY knows how 
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to receive the data …[and] it deals with both revenue and expenditure… We met with those 
who designed GBCO and LGBC and defined what to do from each side. Only work from their 
side [the consultant] was billed, we didn't bill GIZ anything.  
WMONEY accommodated local conditions, unlike ASTER. A development team member 
explained: 
A server is needed for ASTER and an established network and individual workstations…But 
the …network …is a major challenge … However, for WMONEY a single workstation suffices; 
and if the volume of data increases significantly an appropriate network may be considered to 
increase the workstations required, but this is not necessary presently. …With ASTER, the 
database is ORACLE which is heavy (and difficult to manipulate) … and licence costs etc. are 
expensive… so the operating cost is very high. WMONEY is developed with less expensive 
tools – the cost is insignificant …[It] is very simple which facilitates its adaptation as users’ 
needs evolve. …ASTER is very complex and …not made for an environment like ours; we 
cannot modify its parameters easily to respond to users’ needs. We depend on those who hold 
the sources and are responsible for maintaining it. 
Infrastructure networks, including the internet, are problematic in Africa and Benin. 
Insufficient power is the largest constraint and cause of failure for infrastructure projects, 
including IT ones (Commonwealth Business Council, 2013; WB, 2010). WMONEY 
accommodated these deficiencies, whereas ASTER, despite over a decade of implementation, 
did not and in 2015 it remained incomplete. The development team claimed WMONEY cost 
less than US$30,000, whereas ASTER has cost over US$12 million11. Stakeholders recognised 
that WMONEY is simple, flexible and easily adaptable to evolving user needs. The team who 
worked on both WMONEY and ASTER commented that ASTER’s lack of such attributes 
caused major implementation problems. A team member commented:  
We are managing something [ASTER] which doesn’t exist. We are doing our best to maintain it so 
they don't blame [us]. …unfortunately, we must manage these contradictions. 
5.2 Donors: pragmatism and conditions 
GIZ and the development team initially wished to address all government accounting but senior 
civil servants refused to extend it to central government accounting. A senior TAD official 
commented: ‘it is not in the interest of certain people that you bring in more accounting’. The 
issue was politically sensitive. A TAD official explained: 
It was France who brought ASTER and required us to hold onto it. So they [officials] no longer 
wanted to hear anything about WMONEY in central government accounting …It’s that 
pressure that made officials [at TAD] to put themselves behind ASTER unconditionally. 
A development team member recalled: 
When we got this opportunity [to develop WMONEY], we said to officials: ‘With this 
programme we can deal with both the central government and local government accounting. It 
would be easier for local public accountants to use one tool …The proposal was rejected 
outright ...we openly received serious threats… They don't want to see us in that area; and we 
needed to withdraw… It was stated very clearly. I couldn’t believe it – I was numb. 
Consequently, developers concentrated on local government accounting. Local public 
accountants complained that no programme dealt with central government accounting but to 
no avail. For example:  
																																								 																				
11 This could not be corroborated from accounting records or other documents as access was denied.  
11	
	
We are public accountants with two hats: principal accountants [comptables assignataires] for 
local governments, and accountant representatives [comptables mandataires] for the State 
Chief Accountant … So we maintain simultaneously local and central government accounting. 
We need the programme [WMONEY] to keep both but currently it is impossible.  
GIZ focussed on ‘what can work locally?’, and letting indigenous actors, particularly TAD 
leaders, IT staff, users, and local officials, identify problems and workable solutions. A GIZ 
official commented: ‘Our approach involves coaching, training and professional development; 
we left the design and development of the application to locals’. However, GIZ realised that 
political pressure alongside TAD leadership commitment and civil servants’ participation was 
crucial. As a GIZ official inferred: ‘When there was an issue that required political intervention, 
we didn’t get involved in politics but we tried to lobby through our network of supporters.’  
Another GIZ official said:  
GIZ provided financial support to [develop WMONEY]. …when someone needs to come from 
outside to make it work, then things will come to a standstill; and the programme would bear 
within itself the germs of its non-use. So WMONEY is developed 100% by TAD technicians. 
They responded with alacrity, working weekends and during breaks when necessary. A user 
exclaimed: ‘I came to Cotonou …for an issue with WMONEY and I was given an IT official 
who helped during his lunch break.’ However, GIZ officials recognised this was partly a 
consequence of conditionalities.  
The TAD is monitored from all sides… the work we do with the TAD is facilitated by the EU 
and the government signed a conditionality agreement to ensure transparency in the 
management of the financial support provided by donors. …Without such a 
conditionality …and the attention given to TAD activities by the EU… it would be very difficult.  
Production of the Comptes de Gestions was a condition for subsequent budgetary support ...by 
donors including the EU …Thus, TAD officials pressured civil servants to produce the Comptes 
de Gestion within the required time to report back to the EU that this conditionality has been 
achieved. …WMONEY certainly benefited from this.  
When donors paid limited attention, reform could be sluggish, as a GIZ official recounted: 
We are also working with the Revenue Department …There is no EU conditionality and no 
performance indicators as a condition for budget support. …The absence …made the attention 
given to fiscal decentralisation initiatives and related reforms very weak compared to the TAD. 
5.3 Indigenous leadership, good governance and reform success 
Despite delegating powers to local officials, TAD’s leadership was important. They provided 
material, financial and regulatory support (memorandum 2163/DGTCP/RGF/SCL/SP), and 
incentives and sanctions to reinforce compliance. For example:  
The Head of the TAD provided funding for …a computer, a printer and an inverter for each 
local government. [TAD official] 
If accountants failed to produce annual accounts on time, TAD’s senior officials acted. One 
explained: 
The hierarchy gave all Receveurs a deadline to 30 June 2015 to produce the Compte de Gestion. 
Those who didn’t [had] … to explain why. There were six local governments concerned and …five 
produced the accounts… It means they did not use the programme. If transactions are regularly 
entered, there is no reason for a delay. Some accountants were even threatened to be removed… 
Some had to work nights and others had to bring their computers here at the headquarters to seek 
help from the IT staff. People woke up with the pressure exerted; without pressure they wouldn't. 
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By 2016, the deadline to submit the accounts, i.e. the Compte de Gestion, was reduced from 30 
June to 30 April:  
The TAD Head made it very clear: if a Receveur fails to submit his/her accounts by 30 April he/she 
will be …replaced. An administrative note … shows how seriously the hierarchy takes compliance... 
As a result, you won’t see any accountant [i.e. Receveur] waiting for the deadline before submitting 
their accounts. They all file their accounts on time! [TAD official] 
The system improved local governance. Resource deployments were more traceable and 
transparent, it reduced corruption by separating duties of personnel, and it strengthened 
budgetary control and tax collection. 
Previously when the Mayor’s office issued the payment order, the same office issued the 
payment slip – avis de crédit and bon de caisse – and attached it to the payment order to the 
local public accountant: the only thing he did was to sign and pay. Yet the issuance of the 
payment slip should be his responsibility. WMONEY [does this] … and separates duties with 
the Mayor’s office [senior TAD official]. 
The Mayor’s office issues ‘mandats’ [payment orders]. When this gets to WMONEY … it does 
budgetary control. There is an amount of spending for each budget line. If it is budgeted to spend 
[$]100 on stationery, and the Mayor’s office issues a purchase and payment order for [$]15, 
WMONEY will check the account. … Suppose they have used $90 out the $100 budgeted, the 
system would reject it [and it] …will check whether the payment is for a service. If so, taxes need 
deducting …and only the net amount paid to the beneficiary. The system …generates automatically 
the related accounting entries and payment document – the Bon de Caisse – which testifies payment 
has taken place [WMONEY presentation document]. 
Some officials colluded to disguise fraud. TAD officials explained how: 
The purchase or procurement contract the payment order is raised for may be a bogus contract; they 
can put up something fictitious with all the supporting documents. It will go through… be paid and 
[WMONEY] cannot do anything! …The Mayor and the administrative accountant is involved. They 
can involve the local public accountants or decide not to tell him anything. The contract will be paid 
because it comes with all the supporting documents required by the local public accountants …If 
they don't put up fake purchase and procurement contracts, they will inflate the contract price. There 
is no control system to detect this. That’s how they get rich. 
Last week, a local public accountant was presented with a payment order related to New Year 
seasonal celebrations at a local government... [He] knew the event did not take place but he was 
presented with all the evidence required to justify it occurred. So he couldn’t do anything but pay, 
and [WMONEY] couldn’t do anything either. 
However, WMONEY created an audit trail, crucial for ex-post control. A senior TAD official 
explained: 
Once a transaction is entered, it is no longer possible to hide or eliminate it. …Transactions and 
payment orders issued by the Mayor’s office must be paid for in WMONEY by the accountant 
who issues the payment slip …What WMONEY does for good governance is that it provides 
traceability of all transactions incurred [which] …allows audit institutions to access information 
to examine the supporting evidence/documents … [and] whether there has been appropriate 
management of resources. 
WMONEY tracked such transactions. Consequently, ex-post audits, especially by the Chamber 
of Accounts, could hold transgressors to account. For example, an external audit, 
commissioned under Dutch pressure, revealed the PPEA II scandal12 whereby CFA 8 billion 
																																								 																				
12 See: http://www.lanouvelletribune.info/benin/politique/24870-affaire-ppea-2-yayi-presente-les-excuses-
publiques-du-benin-aux-pays-bas [Accessed 2 August 2015] 
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(US$ 16 million) for water improvements, partly funded by the Netherlands, was 
misappropriated. The audit report claimed the perpetrators ‘set up a number of dummy 
companies which signed fake procurement contracts …and then disappeared.’13 When TAD 
officials were asked why they paid these invoices, they responded that all the evidence required 
was provided. 
The reforms are proving dynamic - ‘WMONEY is continually being expanded’ [user] by the 
development team and users, e.g. to ‘Valeurs Inactives’ (inactive values) - tickets collecting 
tax from market traders; stamps in the Mayor’s office legalising documents; parking tickets; 
and procurement contracts. 
Previously, inactive values were a major source of misappropriation. Interviewees recounted:  
The Accounting Division simply recorded cash receipts related to inactive values, nothing else, 
so there was no control. [User] 
People took the tickets, they went in the various markets, they issued them, and cashed the 
money; it was uncontrollable! It happened outside the accounting system. [TAD official]. 
Now the ‘Monitoring of Inactive Values Movements’ application monitored ticket stocks and 
sales. A development team member stated that:  
The local public accountant can check inactive values anytime; it gives them their cash balance, 
how much the Mayor’s agents have deposited, and the stock of tickets at hand …The accountant 
knows exactly whether there is any collection not yet deposited. 
Users confirmed this: 
When we receive the inactive values from the printing house they are entered in the ‘portfolio 
of inactive value account’. When the Régisseur [Steward at Mayor’s office] takes stocks to 
place on the markets they sign a discharge slip and we debit it to the account 
‘Approvisionnement des Agents Collecteurs’ or ‘Correspondants’. You just enter the 
information and WMONEY knows in which accounts to record the various transactions… 
Similarly, when the Régisseur deposits cash collected from inactive values …you integrate 
them in the system… when the accounts do not balance you know where the difference lies and 
you act on it. 
When an inactive value is entered, WMONEY will indicate the amount the Steward at the 
Mayor’s office has taken …So when I do my reconciliation I call the Steward and ask them to 
check the situation at their end… Now when differences occur we investigate them. … When 
you do this regularly, you are not surprised at the year-end with unjustified differences – you 
already know where the problems lie. 
Inactive values were a source of corruption for many years, so the reform met resistance:  
About half the local governments claimed they could not maintain the inactive value account. 
When you ask them why, they say that they don't know how to use it. …The application is very 
simple, they have been trained on it, and all the other governments use it well. [TAD official] 
WMONEY was also expanded to monitor externally funded procurement contracts. These 
were: 
 a significant portion of local government business… when you need some information on a 
contract you must look and re-look for the payment order, a register, and this and that [User].  
																																								 																				
13 See: http://beninwebtv.com/2015/08/benin-scandale-du-ppea-2-les-4-banques-impliquees/ [Accessed 3 
August 2015] 
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Some users had created Excel spreadsheets to monitor these but their capacity was limited. A 
WMONEY application from the development team became operational from January 2016. 
Users were trained on how to use it. Two recounted: 
We attended a seminar and were presented an application about how to monitor procurement 
contracts… WMONEY gives …information regarding related transactions: whether the contractor 
has paid the withholding deposit; whether work completed has been paid. You have all the 
information you need on all procurement contracts and the different stages they have gone through.  
With WMONEY you can monitor procurement contracts - even when you are removed from your 
position, your successor can follow up everything. 
GIZ’s support for accounting emanated from their belief that good governance is essential to 
development. An official commented:  
It would be wrong to leave aside governance issues on the basis that they have no or limited 
links with poverty reduction. [Otherwise] we will do the same things we did in the 1970s by 
supporting large infrastructure projects not managed in a sustainable manner.  
GIZ’s officials claimed WMONEY reduced poverty because citizens and civil society 
organisations could participate in public hearings about the accounts. A GIZ official stated: 
An aim of decentralisation which GIZ supports is to improve service delivery, quality of 
spending, and citizens’ access to basic services… Good management of local governments in 
terms of finance and accounting contributes to this… We have identified several cases 
supporting this. … Support for capacity building in budget management, production of accounts 
and citizens’ participation in local governments, for example, has positively influenced clean 
water and education service provisions. … When deciding on transfers [now we] …first ask 
whether the governments are well managed, whether they have a good accounting system, 
whether funds are traceable and so on. … Financial governance contributes to poverty reduction. 
Capacity building extended to: 
representatives from civil society organisations … while [GIZ] supports the production of 
accounts, it also assists the organisation of public hearings on the accounts [which] …have 
strengthened transparency in the management of local governments’ business (2014 GIZ 
report).  
The report noted how public hearings have become habitual for local officials and users. 
 5.4. Neo-patrimonial leadership challenges 
Neo-patrimonialism represents a major challenge for development reforms, not least 
accounting ones, in Benin (Bierschenk et al., 2003). Without the attention GIZ and the EU paid 
to the TAD’s activities through conditionalities, the reform, albeit its exclusive focus on local 
governments, would have been difficult or even impossible to implement. Nevertheless, a GIZ 
Official acknowledged resistance from political leaders beyond the remit of the TAD: ‘When 
decisions over which we have no control come from the top, they can change a lot of things.’ 
More progress would have materialised had reforms not faced neo-patrimonial challenges. For 
example, the appointment, qualifications, transfers and promotions of accountants remained 
problematic: many did not meet meritocratic criteria.  
Some local public accountants appointed did not really qualify, which made things complicated 
[TAD official].  
Staff transfers and career development are strange; politics gets in and people are rotated as 
[political] officials wish. So, someone can be trained today and master the system, and the 
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following day he is removed and put in a different position somewhere else. And they would 
send someone who has never heard about the programme. [GIZ Official] 
When civil servants wanted to develop WMONEY to address central government accounting 
needs at municipalities, TAD officials received orders from above stopping this: ‘they don't 
want to see us in that area’ [Senior TAD official]. Neo-patrimonialism still inhibits substantive 
reform and participation.  
6. Conclusions 
GIZ support allowed civil servants to resuscitate WMONEY, abandoned for about a decade, 
across all local governments. Enquiries to the TAD in March 2017 revealed that local 
governments now produce their accounts before the deadline of 30 April. New developments 
for managing donor funded projects and producing financial statistics for economic analysis 
are being implemented without GIZ’s support. Its gradual phasing out of direct involvement 
from the reforms since 2016 is consistent with GIZ’s focus on sustainable development. 
WMONEY granted local civil servants and beneficiaries influence over the technology, its 
design and implementation, and leadership and ownership of the process. This increased their 
sense of accountability, commitment, and created a cheap but effective system suited to local 
conditions and laid the basis for greater civil society participation in budgeting. Thus the 
accounting reform met expectations regarding outcomes (preparation of accounts and their use) 
and process (local involvement). It is difficult to assess whether a participatory process is 
worthwhile (Cleaver, 1999; Morris, 2003). However, our case reveals the effectiveness of a 
participatory approach which combines instrumentalism and empowerment. The findings are 
consistent with similar fieldwork (Awio and Northcott, 2001) and research advocating greater 
indigenous participation (Lassou and Hopper, 2016; Mosse, 2004). The results contrast sharply 
with many other government accounting reforms in Africa where often participatory 
involvement does not extend beyond central government officials in capital cities.  
Senior TAD officials soon recognised they did not fully understand issues on the ground and 
supported participatory development of WMONEY lower down. Nevertheless, their leadership 
and commitment were essential as the project required central government co-ordination and 
support. WMONEY was implemented incrementally to control potential failure costs alongside 
continual training to develop local accounting capacity. This proved more effective than the 
wholesale implementation of complex foreign systems (Hopper et al., 2017). Local 
involvement and training helped sustain the reform when GIZ support ended, unlike many 
other government accounting reforms in Africa (Diamond and Khemani, 2005) and, through 
learning by experience, users successfully requested additional functionalities. The exercise 
reduced local dependence on external technology and central government finance.  
However, the EU and GIZ had to judiciously use conditionalities. Benin’s government is 
widely recognised as neo-patrimonial with little appetite for better central government 
accounting, attested by their substitution of WMONEY by ASTER and its continuation despite 
its failings (Lassou et al., 2014). Senior civil servants would not address central government 
accounting for political reasons but they supported local government reforms, where national 
neo-patrimony’s remit was less. Similarly, donor agencies pragmatically limited reform to what 
was politically feasible, and took advantage of the political space available. The case illustrates 
how civil servants can foster effective reforms despite a national neo-patrimonial political 
regime. Nevertheless, neo-patrimonial patronage remained: staffing was problematic – some 
accountants lacked the necessary skills, and others were promoted despite poor performance 
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and limited accounting knowledge. Also, despite WMONEY’s success, its further 
developments remain problematic. A GIZ official commented: 
We can leave WMONEY as it is or improve it further, and plan its financing… its interface 
with the budgetary programmes in the Mayor’s office remains a challenge. They need a 
consultation framework that brings together officials in local administrations; those who 
developed the programmes; and the accountants… But who will fund it? Who will coordinate 
it? It needs to be institutionalised… When our supports ends we could lobby other donors to 
fund it within the government budget but the concern is whether they will use the money to that 
purpose. 
This reinforces the importance of donors’ long-lasting presence. Without GIZ’s long 
experience in Benin the local government accounting reforms may never have materialised. 
Without their aid and support they may have suffered the fate of other failed African accounting 
reforms. 
To conclude, the study adds to the limited knowledge on implementing public sector 
accounting systems in Africa. Unusually it reports an effective adoption by locals collaborating 
with Northern aid agencies. Despite neo-patrimonialism, ‘space’ was created for local agents 
to act. Given the negative features of neo-patrimonialism, developers had to think and act 
politically to create feasible and sustainable reforms. Often pragmatism and incrementalism 
has to over-ride idealism. The aid agency’s lasting local involvement was vital, which questions 
donors’ reliance on global accounting firms with fleeting local knowledge. Participatory and 
incremental approaches were vital. Local civil servants, when empowered and granted 
ownership under effective central leadership with donor support, have greater capacity to 
design and implement accounting reforms related to governance than is often recognised. 
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